Blocking outbound HTTP from the Home Network, 2021

With the move to HTTPS as a default, I took a chance and recently blocked outbound (EGRESS) HTTP (TCP 80) traffic from my home network. I’ve got around 30 – 40 devices on the network, and I was intrigued to see what we (my family and I) would experience.

With my Unfi Dream Machine Pro, this was a reasonably easy update: Settings -> Traffic & Security -> Global Threat Management -> Firewall. I added a rule for Internet Out that that dropped anything going to port 80:

HTTP reject rule for Internet Out from Unifi Dream Machine Prod

This is a rule I had in place for two days. I checked my own laptop access for HTTPS, SSH, IMAPS and SMTPS egress, and all was fine.

What transpired over the following two days helped me identify the devices and vendors that still produce products that have a dependency to operate using unencrypted HTTP over the Internet.

Logitech Smart Radio

We have had a streaming radio for some time; we still like to listen to London Capital Radio despite the 7-8 hour timezone offset. Within a few minutes of blocking HTTP, the audio stream stopped.

We purchased this device around 2012. On my network, it identifies as a Squeezebox running RedHat. The manufacturer discontinued it years ago and there have been no firmware updates for a long time. It only supports 802.11g wifi in the 2.4 GHz spectrum (is this WiFi 3?).

I wasn’t prepared to replace the device, so for the moment, a work-around rule to permit HTTP (by MAC address) fixes this for the short term. We’re unlikely to see any updates from Logitech anyway.


This one surprised me; I was signing in to a webinar, and the obligatory download tried to execute and stalled. It turned out the installer was doing an HTTP based OCSP check.

Now, for web browsers, OCSP has been mostly relegated to the annals of history, replaced with OCSP Stapling.

OCSP is a network efficient query that a client can do against a Certificate Provider’s endpoint to get a signed confirmation that the certificate in question has not been revoked recently. However, in doing so, it tells the certificate authority which site you (your source IP address) just visited; this is called an Information Disclosure vulnerability. Instead, the website in question fetches these signed validations at a regular interval and passes this to the clients that it’s already communicating with – stapling the validation to the certificate during TLS negotiation: “Hi client, here’s my certificate, and here’s a recent verification that my certificate is not revoked”.

Using HTTP for OCSP isn’t too bad, as the response that is being downloaded is itself cryptographically signed. But it’s still visible in the plain for all to see.

Update 27/9: No response from GoToWebinar.

Enphase Envoy

12 hours later, my solar panel data aggregation service, Enphase Enlighten, alerted me that it was no longer receiving data from my solar panel inverters. With another rule to permit the Envoy controller to make HTTP outbound requests, and the data started flowing.

This is a reasonable issue. The submission of the generation and consumption of power in my home should not be trundling over the Internet unencrypted.

I raised a support request with Enphase (21/September 2021 at 15:04 AWST UTC +8), asking them to contact me, I received a ticket auto-response (03164xxx) but no other contact.

Later that night I tried reaching out over Twitter to any security folk at Enphase, but after 24 hours, no response.

Update 27/9: After a few days of no reply, Enphase asked (via automated email) how my support experience was. Unbelievable!

I then tried calling them on their Australian support number as shown on their website. I ended up in a call queue which was quite amusing in itself; every 5 seconds (no, literally, every 5,000 ms) it would announce that all callers were busy, and then it would restart the same audio music clip, only to then interrupt itself… I gave up after 20 minutes in the queue.

Lastly, I have DMed the Enphase Twitter account, and await a reply.

Enphase does not have a security.txt file on their website!

Any customer data should be transmitted to an HTTPS endpoint. The firmware of the Envoy device should have the Certificate Authority’s Root Certificate, used to issue that Endpoint certificate, in its trust store. The device should receive updates as that Root CA expires and is replaced (this happens every 10 – 20 years per CA). The embedded firmware also would need to keep step with the improving TLS protocols over time, now TLS 1.3 would be ideal, but in future, who knows.

What also struck me was the lack of IPv6 being picked up by this device; not only should it have picked up a new IPv6 address locally, the Endpoint it submits its data to should also be dual-stack IPv4 and IPv6.

Apple iPad 14.8 -> 15.0 upgrade

This one was very unusual. Apple had released iOS 15, and our iPads were about to make the jump from 14.8. However, despite full WiFi signal, the devices keep announcing they couldn’t verify the downloaded image because they couldn’t connect to the WiFi!

I’m hoping Apple can address this dependency before the next iOS update.

Update 27/9: Apple responded on Twitter concerned only that I could install the update, not that the security issue was being investigated, resolved or understood.

Nintendo Switch

It turns out the Nintendo Switch won’t join a WiFi network that doesn’t have outbound HTTP access; it must do a call home or validation using HTTP.


I’ve paused the experiment for the moment, but next month I’ll resume it and find more edge cases where devices we rely upon still use unencrypted channels, exposing our data, without us even knowing…

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